Moving the Lines in Ukraine
The level and quality of military support for Ukraine from NATO countries continues to increase. In just the last few weeks, there have been announcements that the United States will be providing new types of equipment to Ukraine, most notably the M1 Abrams tank, as well as Bradley and Stryker fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and the Patriot missile defense system. Germany will send its own tanks, the Leopard 2, along with armored fighting vehicles. It also announced that it would provide approval to Poland and other countries that want to send Ukraine their own German-supplied Leopard 2 tanks. For Germany this is an historic change of policy. In addition, the British will be providing tanks and armored personnel carriers, as NATO countries also provide the training to use these systems. This even includes sending Ukrainian soldiers to Oklahoma to learn how to effectively use the Patriot missile (which George Will coined as the “Oklahoma front.”)
These weapons systems are not simply oriented toward defending Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainians have surprised the world at how well they have been able to do that. Now, in the midst of what is looking like a slow-moving stalemate in the Donbas region, there is a push to help Ukraine go on the offensive and oust the Russian military from the country entirely. That is what the newest packages of military aid are designed to do, and they offer new capabilities, such as mobility and firepower that can overwhelm the Russians and send them into a retreat. As David Ignatius put it in the Washington Post, “The United States and its NATO allies are providing a new arsenal of mobile weapons – tanks and heavy armored vehicles that would, in theory, allow the Ukrainians to conduct American-style maneuver warfare.” To that end, he says, “Ukrainian soldiers are getting a rush education in what the Pentagon likes to call ‘combined arms operations.’”
There are a number of reasons for these developments. The most significant is the strong performance of Ukraine’s military in not only defending the country, but in retaking territory and going on the offensive. These circumstances, along with the poor performance of Russia’s military, have provided for a degree of optimism in further supporting Ukraine. At the same time, Russia’s targeting of civilians, beginning last fall with multiple waves of missiles and drone attacks against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, along with aggression against the small but strategic eastern city of Bakhmut and in the south, has prompted calls for greater assistance to Ukraine. This change in policy to send more weaponry is NATO’s response.
But there is another dynamic at work here, and that is that the lines have moved with respect to what constitutes an action that would be considered too provocative toward Russia and risk expanding the war beyond Ukraine. The U.S. and NATO have been careful not to push Putin too far at any one time, perhaps even excessively careful in seeking to avoid Putin’s red lines, which may not actually exist. They, quite rightly, want to avoid a larger war. At the same time, the Americans and their NATO allies have learned something over the past eleven months: that support to Ukraine and subsequent pushback against Russia through the provision of military aid can be ratcheted up. The line not to be crossed has continually moved, incrementally, without threatening direct retaliation by Russia against NATO countries.
It would have been, and was, unthinkable for the U.S. and NATO to send tanks, armored personnel carriers and Patriot missiles at the start of the war, but today this is considered appropriate and not overly provocative. The Patriot missile system offers a telling example of this dynamic at work. Not only will an increasingly advanced weapons system be provided, but thousands of soldiers will also travel to the United States to be trained. Moreover, all of this is openly acknowledged.
This clearly demonstrates two things. First is that the United States and its allies have greatly expanded their own view of what is considered acceptable weaponry to provide, and what is an acceptable risk to NATO in response to increased attacks by Russia. And second, they are also sending a message to Russia, signaling (once again), that NATO has not yet reached any line it considers to be going too far. Instead, the U.S. and NATO have moved that line, and they will continue to expand military aid and push the line further.
Where does this end? With more advanced weapons systems being introduced into the war? With American bases and/or troops in Ukraine? It all depends upon how things work out in 2023 as more military aid pours into Ukraine. However, it would not be surprising to see more of the continued “delicate incrementalism” that has characterized the increasingly robust commitment by NATO to arm Ukraine.
After all, Ukraine has become the place that NATO sees as critical to defend Europe and protect liberal democracy. Considering President Zelensky’s skill at channeling Winston Churchill in his speeches to both the U.S. Congress and the British Parliament, it seems clear that he sees Ukraine as facing the same type of challenge as Britain did, for the same reasons, and needing the same support to ensure Ukraine’s defense, as well as that of NATO and the liberal democratic project. We shall see.
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My co-author Thomas Graham Jr. is the former Acting Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) under President Clinton, and the Special Representative of President Clinton for Arms Control, Non-proliferation and Disarmament. He served as general counsel of ACDA during the presidencies of Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush. He is also the author of several books on nuclear arms control, US foreign policy, and American politics.
Linked Articles:
George Will, “Germany can’t hesitate sending tanks to Ukraine,” Washington Post, January 19, 2023.
David Ignatius, “The Ukraine front is likely to move in 2023. But which way?” Washington Post, January 17, 2023.
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